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Licence to Operate: Mapping the Public Acceptability of Facial Recognition Technology

New just-published peer-reviewed research sheds light on how facial recognition technology is perceived in certain contexts, why ‘public acceptability’ for it is uneven, and what this means for operators of this emerging technology.



Why is facial recognition technology (FRT) controversial in some scenarios but widely accepted in others? Why have some deployments of FRT in retail stores, for example, resulted in media controversy, while most of us are happy to have our facial images captured at airport passport control? Why are many of us comfortable using the technology to unlock our smart phones yet uncomfortable about its use in monitoring public spaces?

 

In an article just published in Massey University’s National Security Journal, Optic Security Group’s Innovation & Risk Manager Nicholas Dynon writes that international research on FRT ‘public acceptability’ demonstrates that some deployments of FRT are more publicly acceptable than others.


“When an organisation understands the deployment-specific patterns of public acceptability of FRT, it can ensure that it possesses the social licence to operate this emerging technology and thus engage with it with confidence.”

 

“The research tells us that public acceptability is contingent upon whether the technology is being operated by individuals, government, or private sector organisations, and for what purpose,” says Nicholas. “In short, context matters.”

 

Nicholas’ article analyses 200 data points covering a range of FRT deployment scenarios, including residential, school, hospital, airport, workplace, law enforcement, criminal investigation, public safety, counterterrorism, retail, and gaming, in order to identify patterns of public acceptability and develop a model for mapping the acceptability of specific FRT deployments.

 

According to the data, individuals’ comfort levels with crime-focused police FRT deployments, for example, appear to be dependent on the nature of the crime. In the main, people are more comfortable with the use of FRT for the investigation of serious crimes yet resistant to the technology being used as an investigative or monitoring tool for minor offences and antisocial behaviours.

 

In retail contexts, the public is more accepting of FRT to identify shoplifters, antisocial patrons, and fraud than it is of other use cases, such as loyalty programs, advertising, payments, and the tracking of customer behaviour. In Australia and New Zealand, however, the public acceptability of FRT in retail to identify shoplifters is weak relative to the US.

 

“The frequency of FRT controversies and missteps suggests that security consultants and other practitioners responsible for providing advice to organisations in relation to the suitability of security systems often fail to incorporate the ‘public acceptability’ of potential FRT deployments within their advice,” said Nicholas.

 

“When an organisation understands the deployment-specific patterns of public acceptability of FRT, it can ensure that it possesses the social licence to operate this emerging technology and thus engage with it with confidence.”

 

As Innovation & Risk Manager, Nicholas is a member of Optic Security Group’s Product Innovation team, which is focused on the identification, testing, and assessment of emerging security and surveillance technologies, including solutions powered by video analytics and artificial intelligence.

 

To explore the data and FRT Public Acceptability Model, read the full open access article at the National Security Journal website.

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